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1. Introduction 
The convergence of per-capita income across the European regions is one of the most 
striking issues in the European Union agenda. Recent studies based on historical regional 
data corroborate that for over half a century, 1950 to 1980/1990, per capita income across 
Western European regions converged. However, over the past three decades, this 
evolution has weakened and even reversed. Particularly, since the Great Recession 
divergence has resumed again as it used to be in the first phases of the industrialization 
processes. Consequently, a new N-curve between per capita income and regional 
inequality is emerging in some European economies and in the United States (Ganong 
and Shoag, 2017). 
This upsurge in spatial inequality has been associated with the Information and 
Communications Technologies (ICT) and with the unequal spatial distribution of the new 
knowledge-intensive activities. Recent technological change seems to be more intensive 
in skills based on knowledge than the technological change in the past. For this reason 
those regions with more developed institutions, social networks based on knowledge or 
more developed skill labour and capital markets seem to be more prone to attract talent 
and host the new industries and services (Glaeser et al, 2014). The regions where these 
specific kind of cities are located seem to become new focus of agglomeration in the 
developed countries in general, and in Europe in particular. Consequently, the recent 
upsurge of regional inequality seems to be intrinsically linked to the way the knowledge 
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intensive technologies propel revival of those urban centres better endowed with several 
sorts of knowledge related capital (human capital, social capital, research and 
development activities and networks, universities, knowledge intensive industries, etc.).   
This paper focuses on the measurement of regional inequality in the EU-13 since 
2000 up to 2015 and tries to answer the question whether the recent upsurge of regional 
inequality responds to a new technological shock and sets the start of a new inverted-U 
process in Europe. For this purpose we focus our attention in how some leading regions 
have increased their distances to the European average. Then distances in terms of labour 
productivity with regard to the leading regions are split down in the three components of 
the shift-share analysis, trying to elucidate the relative role of a new structural change 
process, the role of the technological catch-up with the leader regions and the new 
patterns of sector specialization in the increase of regional inequality in Europe.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the 
literature on the relationship between economic development, spatial inequality and the 
role of structural change in the process. Section 3 presents the data gathered to run this 
research and some descriptive statistics of the evolution of per capita income and labour 
productivity inequality in the European regions since the 2000 up to 2015 for the NUTS-
2 regions of EU-13. We put attention on the potential effect of agglomeration to stretch 
labour productivity distances between regions. Section 4 performs a shift-share analysis 
to disentangle the role displayed by the technological gap within industries, the structural 
change and the regional specialization in the increase of regional disparities. In the 
concluding remarks our main findings are summarized. 
2. Theory and evidence: The link between spatial inequality and the industry mix 
The literature on the evolution and determinants of regional disparities rests on the 
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seminal work of Williamson (1965) that postulated an inverted-U shape relationship 
between economic development and regional income per capita inequality.1 In the early 
stages of industrialization the distribution of economic activity across regions becomes 
more unequal. The manufacturing and the high value activities concentrate in a handful 
of advanced regions while the rest of the regions remain linked to agriculture or more 
traditional manufacturing. Productivity in the modern industries increases more quickly 
fuelled by technological change and economies of scale and, hence, income per capita 
grows faster in the industrialized regions than in the traditional ones.  
In turn, in more advanced phases of development, the reallocation of factors (capital 
and labour) between industries and across regions in search for higher remunerations, 
jointly with technological diffusion across regions, and the compensating effect of 
economic policy, will tend to mitigate regional disparities and push convergence between 
regions.  
In this respect, the preliminary evidence presented by Williamson (1965) in support 
of this hypothesis was not robust enough due to the short time span considered. Later on, 
the use by Kim (1995, 1998) of regional historical data for the United States proved the 
existence of the inverted-U curve in the long run. In Europe, especially since the 
publication by Geary and Stark (2002) of a new method to territorialize national GDP 
across regions, the number of countries with historical regional data has soared.2 The 
evidence provided for many countries reveals that, at least since mid 19th century, the 
Williamson’ curve is hold in some countries (Great Britain, Spain or Portugal), while 
																																																								
1 Based in the famous Kuznets curve (Kuznets, 1955) that postulates the same relationship between a 
country per capita income level and the personal inequality. 
2	In Europe, the first historical studies were based on cross-section or panel data using official databases 
starting in 1975 or 1980. Their main drawback is to offer a time span too short to detect the potential 
“structural change effects” to explain the inverted U-shaped pattern. Most of the European regions included 
in these samples exhausted the “structural change process” in the Golden Age or even before.  
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others, such as Belgium, Sweden and France, exhibit a persistent decline in regional 
disparities since the last decades of the 19th century. Historical evidence is still less 
concluding for Italy where a big North-South divide is held. 3 
More recently, Rosés and Wolf (2019), using normalized historical estimates for 16 
European countries4 and 173 NUTS-2 regions along 1900-2010, conclude that disparities 
in per capita income declined along 1900-1980, held up in the 1980’s and raised again in 
the last two decades. A similar upturn in regional income inequality emerge when the 
focus is put on particular country experiences. For instance, the U.S. (Ganong and Shoag, 
2017; Klein, 2019), the U.K. (Geary and Stark, 2016), Sweden (Enflo and Rosés, 2015), 
Spain (Martínez-Galarraga, Rosés and Tirado, 2015) and France (Rosés and Sanchis, 
2019) exhibit a clear upturn in regional income disparities since 1980. Other studies based 
on econometric analysis using cross-country data for the last decades, reveal that the 
inverted-U curve has been completed and that a new pattern of regional income inequality 
is emerging.5  
In the explanation of the U-shaped pattern, the structural change hypothesis 
prevails. The historical experience of the U.S. regions confirms that the nationwide 
convergence between agricultural and non-agricultural wages and the faster transition of 
the labour force in the poorer regions from agricultural to non-agricultural jobs explains 
overall per capita income convergence across the U.S. states in the 20th century6. Similar 
results have been tested for some European countries, such as Spain, Sweden, Italy and 
																																																								
3 For Great Britain see Crafts (2005) and Geary and Stark (2016); for Spain, Martínez-Galarraga et al. 
(2010, 2015); Italy by Felice (2011); Portugal by Badia-Miró et al (2012); Belgium by Buyst (2010 and 
2011) and Sweden by Enflo and Rosés (2015). There are alternative estimates for France along the 20th 
century by Combes et al. (2011), Caruana-Galizia (2013), Bazot (2014) and Rosés and Sanchis (2019).  
4 Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, Ireland and United States. 
5 For instance, Barrios and Strobl (2009), Henning et al. (2011), Lessman (2014), Castells-Quintana et al 
(2015) and Lessman and Seidel (2017). 
6 See Kim (1998); and Caselli and Coleman (2001) and Kim and Margo (2003).  
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France7. Regional disparities grew in the early stages of modern economic growth but 
then convergence occurred for most of the 20th century, coming to a halt in the last quarter 
of the 20th century. First, regional inequality increased pushed by industrialization and 
market integration that concentrated modern industries in a few regions. But in the second 
half of the 20th century, strong regional convergence was the norm and the reallocation 
of factors from agriculture to industry in the backward regions seems to make the biggest 
contribution to the convergence process. 
Previous studies based on official databases on regional Gross Value Added (GVA) 
used to depart from 1975, or even later. These studies found that regional inequality was 
mainly explained by differences in labour productivity and by the existence of 
productivity differentials within the same sectors in different regions.8 The existence of 
region specific factors strongly related to regional endowments of productive capital, 
transport infrastructures, and research and development expenditure are more significant 
in explaining regional differences in productivity than the industry composition (Ezcurra 
et al., 2005).9 The weak impact of the industry mix on productivity differentials is seen 
as a consequence of the exhaustion of the structural change process in Europe in the 
decades following the Second World War, such as the recent historical studies seem to 
confirm.  
																																																								
7 For intance, Sweden (Enflo and Rosés, 2015), Spain (Martinez-Galarraga, Rosés and Tirado, 2015), 
France (Combes et al, 2011; Díez, Rosés and Sanchis, 2016) and Italy (Felice et al, 2018). 
8 Esteban (2000) arrives to this conclusion performing a shift-share analysis based in data of EUROSTAT 
(1995) database, for the NUTS-2 regions of Belgium, France, Italy, Portugal, Spain and Germany, with 
data at 6 sectors level. Lately, Ezcurra et al (2005) arrive to similar results with data for 1977-1999 from 
Cambridge Econometrics dataset at NUTS-2 level for 15 European countries. Other variants of the shift-
share analysis have been explored by Le Gallo et al (2003), arriving to similar conclusions. 
9 In the last decades additional regional specific factors have been gathered around the concept of Territorial 
Capital. It includes the endowment of climate related factors and natural resources, the quality of live, or 
the agglomeration economies provided by the cities or industrial districts and other factors such as social 
capital (informal rules, solidarity…) (Camagni, 2017). 
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However, as suggested by Barrios and Strobl (2009), there is no reason to expect 
that changes in regional productivity differentials will stop when all the countries become 
industrialized. In fact, other types of technological shocks, similar to those happened at 
the starting of the industrialization process, could lead not only to a deeper within industry 
gap across regions but also to the start of a new structural change process that puts in 
motion a new wave of regional disparities.  
For instance, the recent upsurge in spatial inequality has been associated with the 
ICT technologies and with the unequal spatial distribution of the new knowledge-
intensive activities. Berger and Frey (2014) find that the ICT technologies have traced the 
performance of the U.S. cities since 1980’s. According to them, the new technological 
change appears biased towards more abstract skills and hence the new jobs emerge in 
industries and services more knowledge intensive. This technological pattern has altered 
the economic geography in the American cities, where those endowed with analytical and 
interactive skills have adapted better to the Computer Revolution than those specialized 
in routine task industries.  
In the same line of reasoning, Glaeser and Resseger (2010) find a strong correlation 
between labour productivity and city size in cities with high levels of skill while irrelevant 
otherwise. Those American cities better endowed with institutions and social networks 
based in knowledge have revealed more resilient to the current challenges. (Glaeser et al, 
2014). This kind of urban areas are the ongoing focus of agglomeration of talent, capital 
and innovation, and hence, of economic activity. Consequently, the agglomeration of the 
new skill intensive activities in some cities is becoming a new engine of regional income 
disparities. 
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The new wave of technological change has promoted new types of services and 
industries based in high-skill labour at the expense of traditional low-skill activities and 
resource-intensive industries. This fact is configuring a pattern of specialization in which 
knowledge-intensive activities are breaking distances between those regions well-
endowed to cope the new demands of skills and research and innovation structures and 
those less ready to attend them.  In the next section the new pattern of regional per capita 
income and labour productivity in Europe is described, along with the increasing 
relevance in this process of some leading regions, most of them regions where the country 
capital city is located. 
 
3. Data and measure of regional inequality 
3.1. Data 
The data used in this paper comes from the BD.EURS (NACE Rev.2) dataset (see 
Escribá-Pérez et al, 2019). Nevertheless, we modify the original dataset in order to adapt 
better the available information to the objective of the paper. Specifically, we extend the 
number of regions and the number of sectors (Table 1), which allow us to do a more 
exhaustive analysis about the role of the industry-mix in the evolution of regional 
inequality in Europe. 
Our dataset covers 156 regions belonging to 13 EU countries (EU-13).10 Regions 
are defined as NUTS-2, except for Germany and the United Kingdom where regions are 
																																																								
10 Luxembourg and Ireland are excluded from the sample because they are small countries (Luxembourg has one region 
only). Moreover, it is widely known the fact that Ireland has by far the lowest standard rate of corporation tax on 
manufacturing among the advanced economies, resulting in multinational companies “locating a very high fraction of 
the enterprise’s global profits in Ireland. Consequently, it could increase national macroeconomic indicators as the 
gross domestic product (OECD, 2016). Crescenzi and Giua (2016) also excluded from their analysis these two 
countries. 
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defined as NUTS-1.11 The dataset is disaggregated in 10 different sectors according to 
the NACE Rev. 2 (at one digit): agriculture, forestry and fishing; manufacturing; 
extractive industries, energy and water utilities; construction; wholesale and retail trade, 
transport and storage, hotels and restaurants; information and communication; financial 
and insurance activities; real estate activities; professional, scientific and technical 
services, administration and support service activities; and non-market services (public 
administration and defense, compulsory social security, education, human health, social 
work activities). 
 
Table 1. Dataset 
Countries 13 countries Austria (AT), Belgium (BE), Germany (DE), Denmark (DK), Greece (EL), 
Spain (ES), Finland (FI), France (FR), Italy (IT), The Netherlands (NL), 
Portugal (PT) 
Sweden (SE), the United Kingdom (UK) 
Regions 156 regions 
NUTS-1 (DE, UK) 
NUTS-2 (AT, BE, DK, EL, ES, FI, FR, IT, NL, PT, SE) 
Sectors 10 sectors 
 Agriculture, forestry and fishing (A) 
 Extractive industries (B), Energy (D) and water (E) utilities 
 Manufactures (C) 
 Construction (F) 
 Wholesale and retail trade (G), Transport and storage (H) and 
Hotels and restaurants (I) 
 Information and communication (J) 
 Financial and insurance activities (K) 
 Professional, scientific and technical (M) and Administrative and 
support service  activities (N) 
 Real estate activities (L) 
 Non-Market services (O-U) 
Period 2000–2015 
 
																																																								
11 Crescenzi and Giua (2016) and de Dominicis (2011) also combine NUTS-1 and NUTS-2 regions in their 
respective empirical studies. 
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Following the BD.EURS (NACE Rev.2) methodology, we get the variables gross 
value added  (measure in €2010) and employment, which allows us to compute the GVA 
per worker (measure in €2010) at regional level for the 10 different sectors. In order to 
complete the dataset with the GVA per capita, we get information about regional 
population from Eurostat (2018). The dataset for this paper spans the period 2000–2015. 
3.2. Descriptive analysis 
3.2.1. Regional inequality in Per Capita GVA and labour productivity 
In this section some basic statistics describe the evolution of regional dynamics in the 156 
European regions included in the sample. First, inequality is measured using different 
indicators. Table 2 reports the coefficient of variation (CV) in column [1], the population 
weighted coefficient of variation (WCV) in column [2], the interdecile ratio (P90/P10) in 
column [3], the interquartile index (P75/P25) in column [4] and the Gini and the Theil 
(GE) indexes in columns [5] and [6] respectively.  
Table 2. Inequality Indexes for per capita GVA. NUTS-2 regions, EU-15 
year 
CV1 
[1] 
WCV11 
[2] 
P90/P10 
[3] 
P75/P25 
[4] 
Gini 
[5] 
Theil GE(0) 
[6] 
2000 0.329 0.343 2.246 1.511 0.177 0.048 
2001 0.323 0.335 2.212 1.497 0.174 0.046 
2002 0.319 0.331 2.214 1.497 0.172 0.045 
2003 0.308 0.312 2.132 1.471 0.166 0.041 
2004 0.308 0.313 2.126 1.481 0.166 0.041 
2005 0.311 0.318 2.078 1.474 0.167 0.042 
2006 0.311 0.316 2.159 1.513 0.167 0.042 
2007 0.311 0.322 2.179 1.507 0.167 0.043 
2008 0.312 0.312 2.184 1.467 0.168 0.041 
2009 0.306 0.302 2.170 1.405 0.164 0.039 
2010 0.321 0.316 2.278 1.450 0.173 0.043 
2011 0.332 0.326 2.389 1.492 0.181 0.046 
2012 0.344 0.340 2.497 1.474 0.188 0.049 
2013 0.351 0.345 2.624 1.450 0.192 0.051 
2014 0.346 0.351 2.553 1.458 0.188 0.051 
2015 0.344 0.365 2.525 1.462 0.187 0.053 
2000-20152 0.292 0.407 0.784 -0.220 0.368 0.679 
Note:  1 The Williamson Index when the Coefficient of Variation is population weighted. 2Annual average 
growth rates for 2000-2015. 
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In general, results in Table 2 denote an increase in the dispersion between the 156 
regions of EU-15 in terms of CV, WCV, P90/P10, Gini and Theil indexes in 2000-2015; 
but a decrease in terms of the P75/P25 range. According to the CV and the WCV the 156 
European regions have scattered more about the European average between 2000 and 
2015 and, consequently, -convergence has been prevented. Contrarily, regions ranged 
between the first and the third quartiles are in 2015 closer than they were in 2000. 
Consequently, it seems that the area in the central part of the distribution has squeezed 
and the distance between the first and the third quartile has shortened.  
As these results are not concluding enough, it is interesting to explore the pattern 
followed by other inequality indexes. The Gini and the Theil ones provide more accurate 
measures of inequality than the CV and the WCV because they compute all the distances 
between any pair of regions in the distribution, and not only the dispersion with regard to 
the average. Additionally, both have the ability to reflect in their values any change in the 
relative position of the regions independently they concern to regions located both above 
or both under the mean.12  
As can be observed in Table 2, the two indexes report an increase of inequality for 
the whole period, but especially since 2007. The Gini Coefficient grew at an average 
annual rate of 0.368% for 2000-2015 and the Theil (0) at 0.679 %. These results are 
consistent with the P90/P10 range that grew at 0.784% per year. It suggests that distances 
between the two poles of the distribution have increased and consequently, distances 
between any region inside the distribution and the two poles too. The simple consideration 
																																																								
12 One of the most interesting properties required to a good inequality index is to fulfil the “Dalton Criteria”. 
It consists on reflecting in the value of the index any regressive distribution of income between two pair of 
individuals (regions in our study), independently both individuals are positioned above or both under the 
average. This property is not satisfied by the CV, the WCV or by the interquartile or interdecile ratios.  
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of this fact could explain the higher push-up of the Theil and the Gini indexes when 
compared with the CV or the WCV which only record distances with regard to the mean. 
 
3.2.2. Kernel density functions 
To shed further light on the distributional changes happened in the poles of the 
distribution, Figure 1 shows the Kernel densities of per capita GVA and labour 
productivity for 2000 and 2015. Regional incomes are plotted on the x-axis, while the 
associated density is presented on the y-axis. The per capita GVA distribution presents a 
positive skew with the tail on the right hand side. This Kernel function barely moves to 
the right between 2000 and 2015, while regional incomes have compressed around the 
European mean and the head of the distribution inflates. These facts indicate that there 
are not substantial changes around the mean and that the observed increase in income 
inequality comes out of the upper tail of the distribution.  
Following Duro and Esteban (1998) we have proceeded to break down the Theil 
index into two factors: the participation rate (EMP/POP) and the labour productivity 
ሺGVA/EMPሻ13 to explore whether the regional disparities in per capita GVA are due to 
divergent trajectories in the demographic patterns of the regions or to labour 
productivity.14 The Theil decomposition reveals that around 75% of regional disparities 
in per capita GVA are explained by disparities in labour productivity, while the 
																																																								
13 Originally, Duro & Esteban (1998) broke down the Theil index of regional per capita income into four 
factors: (i) labour productivity, (ii) participation rate, (iii) active over working-age population rate, and (iv) 
working-age over total population rate. We only broke down into employment rate and labour productivity. 
 
14 Furthermore, the labour productivity is preferred to per capita GDP to avoid some distortions caused the 
way variables are measured (Eurostat, 2005). GDP is estimated at workplaces while people are counted 
where they live and may move to work across regions. Furthermore, the “per worker” measurement avoids 
counting people who do not work such as retirees and other collectives. 
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employment rate copes a modest 20-25%.15 These shares have remained quite stable 
across the fifteen years analysed and are consistent with Duro and Esteban (1998)’s 
conclusion that most of regional disparities arise from regional differences in labour 
productivity. Hence, in what follows we will focus our analysis in the evolution of labour 
productivity.  
Figure 1 also contents the labour productivity Kernel density functions for 2000 
and 2015. Now, the positive skew of the distribution disappears and the function behaves 
more normally than in the pc GVA case; the distribution moves more clearly to the right 
and the two poles of the distribution inflate. Briefly, slight economic growth in Europe in 
the fifteen years analysed has caused convergence around the EU-13 average while 
increased distances between the average and the richest regions in per capita GVA terms. 
Consequently, when regional inequality is explored in labour productivity terms 
polarization emerges as a defining fact across the European regions.16  
 
 
																																																								
15 Algebraically, the Theil index of per capita GDP is decomposed into a population-weighted sum of the 
inequality indices of labour productivity (LP), the participation rate (PR): 
ሺݔ, ݏሻ ൌ ෍ݏ௜ log ൬ߤݔ௜൰௜
ൌ ෍ݏ௜
௜
ቊlog ܩܸܣ ܧܯܲ⁄ܩܸܣ௜ ܧܯ ௜ܲ⁄ ൅ log
ܧܯܲ ܱܲܲ⁄
ܧܯ ௜ܲ ܱܲ ௜ܲ⁄ ቋ 
where ݏ௜  denotes the share of region ݅ in the total EU-13 population, ߤ is EU-13 average of per capita income, and ݔ௜ is regional average of per capita income. 
 
 
16  Ezcurra and Pascual (2007) studied the relationship between regional polarization and economic 
development in the European Union. 
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Figure 1. Kernel distribution GVA/Population and GVA/EMP 
	
	SOURCE: Own elaboration with data described in section 2. 
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3.2.3. Regions at the two poles of the distribution 
The box-plot diagram in Figure 2 let visualize the changes in the regional distribution of 
per worker GVA with more detail and identify movements in the poles of the distribution. 
The box contains 50% of the probability mass distribution. Therefore the bigger the box, 
the bigger is dispersion in regional GVA per worker. The horizontal line inside the box 
represents the median value and the extreme values of the vertical lines outside represent 
1.5 times the interquartile distance; the small circles represent the outlier regions. The 
size of the box has barely shrunk between 2000 and 2015 while the median value has 
soared. In 2000, the unique outlier region at the top pole of the distribution was London; 
by 2015, other six regions swell this rank (Brussels, Bravant-Wallon, Hovedstaden, Île-
de-France, Groningen and Stockholm). This group of regions inflates the upper tail of the 
Kernel function represented in Figure 1. At the opposite pole, Norte and Centro, both in 
Portugal, were in 2000 the outliers at the bottom pole and in 2015 a Greek region, 
Anatoliki-Makedonia-Thraki, added to the group of lower outliers. The evidence 
provided until now points to the ongoing relevance of a bunch of top regions that push up 
regional disparities and a bunch of poor regions that break away from the central part of 
the distribution. 
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Figure 2. Box-plot diagram GVA per worker in the European regions, 2000 and 2015 
 
    Source: Main text. 
Table 3 ranks the European regions according to their labour productivity in 2015 
to observe what has happened at the poles. In this year the top-10 regions are London, Île 
de France, Stockholm, Brussels, Hovedstaden, Groningen, Brabant-Wallon, Antwerpen, 
Vlaams-Brabant and Noord-Holland. With the exception of London, all these regions 
have increased their distance to the EU-13 with regard 2000. They are around 33% to 
63% above the EU-13 in 2015. On average, their distance to the EU-13 average has 
increased by 10 percentage points with regard to 2000. Additonally, in that year only two 
of them were above 50% of the EU-13 average (London and Brussels), but in 2015 other 
four regions sums up to this group (Île de France, Stockholm, Hovedstaden and 
Groningen). It is interesting to note that the top-5 regions in 2015 correspond to regions 
where the capital city of the corresponding country is located: London (UK), Île de France 
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(France), Stockholm (Sweden), Brussels (Belgium), Hovedstaden (Denmark) and Noord-
Holland (the Netherlands).17 
 
Table 3. Ranking of Labour Productivity at NUTS-2, 2000-2015 (EU-13=1) 
TOP-10  
ISO Region1  20003 Ranking_2000 20154 Ranking_2015
UKI London 1.70 1 1.63 1 
FR10 Île de France 1.38 5 1.59 2 
SE11 Stockholm 1.44 3 1.57 3 
BE10 
Bruxelles-Capitale / Brussels 
Hoofdstedelijk Gewest 1.52 2 1.53 4 
DK01 Hovedstaden 1.43 4 1.51 5 
NL11 Groningen 1.32 9 1.50 6 
BE31 Prov. Brabant Wallon 1.37 7 1.45 7 
BE21 Prov. Antwerpen 1.30 10 1.43 8 
BE24 Prov. Vlaams-Brabant 1.29 11 1.40 9 
NL32 Noord-Holland 1.20 24 1.33 10 
BOTTOM-10 
ISO Region2 2000 Ranking_2000 2015 Ranking_2015
EL52 Kentriki Makedonia 0.59 147 0.59 147 
PT15 Algarve 0.55 151 0.59 148 
EL65 Peloponnisos 0.59 146 0.58 149 
EL43 Kriti 0.53 153 0.58 150 
EL63 Dytiki Ellada 0.54 152 0.58 151 
EL61 Thessalia 0.56 149 0.56 152 
EL54 Ipeiros 0.56 148 0.55 153 
EL51 Anatoliki Makedonia, Thraki 0.52 154 0.52 154 
PT16 Centro (PT) 0.43 155 0.50 155 
PT11 Norte 0.42 156 0.48 156 
Note: 1,2 Regions in this column are ordered according to the 2015 ranking in the last column. 3,4 These two 
columns represent labour productivity of the region with regard to EU-13=1 in 2000 and 2015, respectively. 
 
By contrast the bottom-10 regions are under 59% of the EU-13 for 2000-2015, and 
on average they have shortened their distance to EU-13 by 2 percentage points, from 53% 
of EU-13 in 2000 to 55% in 2015. This group is made up of some Greek regions (Kentriki 
																																																								
17 Rosés and Wolf (2019) find that the capital regions of Europe seem to have increased their size in Europe 
relative to others in terms of population, employment and GVA. When observed along the 20th century, the 
recent upsurge of capital cities in Europe arrives after a period of decline comprised between 1945 and the 
1980s, in line with the long run evolution of regional inequality in Europe. 
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Makedonia, Algarve, Peloponnisos, Kriti, Dytiki Ellada, Thessalia, Ipeiros, Anatoliki 
Makedonia, Thraki) and some Portuguese regions (Centro and Norte). Again, the increase 
in European regional inequality seems to be driven by a group of regions that grew more 
than the average and that is mainly made up of the capital regions of the richest European 
countries, with the exception of Berlin. 
In fact, the regions of the top-ten belong to the richest countries in Europe. Figure 
3 plots regional labour productivity for each country compared with the EU-13 average 
and the rest of EU-13 regions for 2000-2015. The coloured solid line denotes the EU-13 
average, the black dots represent regions within each country, and the grey vertical dots 
represent the rest of the European regions considered. The figure let to appreciate regional 
dispersion within the country as compared with dispersion across the EU-13 regions. It is 
possible to distinguish three sets of countries. First, those with some outstanding regions 
at European level and with most of the regions above the EU-13 average: France, The 
Netherlands, Belgium, Sweden, Denmark and the UK. Second, countries with most of the 
regions around the European average, with an outstanding region at national level but not 
necessarily outstanding at European level: Germany, Austria and Finland. Third, 
countries whose regions are mainly located under the EU-13 average. In this group Spain 
and Italy had at least one region above the EU-13 average, while Greece and Portugal had 
all the regions below the EU-13 average.  
The first group of countries contain the Very High (VH) income regions of Europe, 
that is to say, those whose GDP per capita is over 50% of the European average, according 
to the criteria of Ianmarino et al (2019). Measured in labour productivity terms, only a 
handful of regions in Europe would belong to this group and all of them are located in 
	 18
our first group of countries.18  The VH productivity regions enclose a number of large 
cities, most of them capital cities, such as London, Paris, Brussels, Stockholm and 
Copenhagen. It is interesting to outline that, with the exception of Germany and Sweden, 
regional disparities are increasing inside most of the countries where the VH productivity 
regions are located (United Kingdom, France, The Netherlands and Denmark)19. We 
guess that this outstanding result is related with the revival of the big cities in Europe and 
the emergence of new engines of agglomeration. 
 
																																																								
18 This classification is quite consistent with that proposed by Ianmarino et al (2018) distinguishing between 
Very High (VH), High (H), Medium (M) and Low (L) per capita income regions. Very High GDP per 
capita regions are those over 150% of the EU average; High income regions, those with 120-149% of the 
EU average; Medium GDP per capita regions, with 75-119% and Low regions, with less than 75% of EU 
or national averages.  
19 Several indexes have been used to calculate within country disparities: CV, WCV, P90/P10, P75/P25 ant 
the Theil. Additionally, the Theil decomposition of overall regional disparities in a “within-country effect” 
and a “between-country” effect reveals that for 2000-2015 an increasing part of regional disparities across 
European regions are generated inside the country. The “within-country effect” has risen from 39.89% of 
the overall distances to 45.89%.	
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Figure 3. Regional Labour Productivity by country as compared  
with NUTS-2 regions in EU-13 
	 	
	
	 	
	 	 	
	
	
	
SOURCE: Own elaboration following the Figure 3 in Díez et al (2018) where regional inequalities between 
South-Western economies (Portugal, Spain, France and Italy) along 1860-2010 is analyzed. 
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4. The shift-share analysis 
During the past two decades, several studies coincide in attributing differences in labour 
productivity between European regions to intrinsic structural characteristics of the 
regions rather than to their own industry mix. 20  These region-specific productivity 
differentials uniform across sectors have been related with intrinsic characteristics of the 
regions such as their endowments of human and physical capital, the investment in R&D, 
and even their institutions; otherwise, the exhaustion of the structural change process 
during the Golden Age years explains the weak role of the industry mix in the 
convergence process of the last three decades.  
But now, it is supposed that the current wave of globalization and technological 
change could be changing the economic structure of the regions and their capability to 
absorb the new technologies (Ianmarino et al, 2019). By the one hand, cutting-edge 
technologies stimulate the development of finance, knowledge-intensive industries and 
advanced services. These activities offer new chances for investment and job creation. 
The new jobs are more intensive in the use of highly skilled workers than the traditional 
routine-tasks activities used to be and, therefore, the new activities will tend to 
concentrate in large metropolitan areas where the firms could meet their demands and 
hire skilled workers in high-turnover labour markets.  
Simultaneously, automation and the advance of globalization across the world 
could be damaging the competitive advantages of the medium and low incomes regions 
in Europe. When compared with the richest regions, these regions have traditionally 
enjoyed lower congestion costs and attracted less skill demanding activities. But now the 
																																																								
20	Esteban (2000), Ezcurra et al (2005), Le Gallo et al (2003), Le Gallo and Kamarianakis (2011), Batog 
and Batog (2007).	
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global value chains propelled by the ICT’s technologies, jointly with the long-distance 
transport improvements and the lowering of trade barriers have removed some 
manufacturing activities from medium and low incomes regions in Europe towards new 
emerging regions in the Asian countries. Hence, the richest European regions, by the one 
hand, and the remaining regions, by the other, seem to be confronting the new wave of 
technological change and globalization in drastically opposite ways.   
In this section we propose to decompose the variation in labour productivity across 
the European regions following the shift-share methodology developed by Caselli and 
Tenreyro (2006) in order to disentangle which part of the recent upsurge in labour 
productivity inequality in Europe comes from a “within-industry effect” (technological 
divergence with the leading regions), a “between-industry” effect (a new pattern of 
specialization in the leading regions) or a “structural change” effect (labour reallocation 
across sectors). This method consists on measuring differences in labour productivity (ݕ) 
of each region i with regard to the leading region, L, between t and t-1:  
∆y୲
୧ െ y୲୐
y୲୐ ൌ
y୲୧ െ y୲୐
y୲௅ െ
y୲ିଵ୧ െ y୲ିଵ୐
y୲ିଵ୐  
 (1) 
 
Caselli and Tenreyro (2006) take as benchmark a hypothetic “average region”. 
Notwithstanding, in order to take into account the increasing polarization observed in 
Europe in the period analysed, we have followed Enflo and Rosés (2015)’s work, where 
a leading region is taken as reference. Algebraically: 
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 (2) 
where j denotes the sector, i denotes the region, L the leading region and sjt the share of 
sector j in the total productive value added of the region i. In our study five benchmark 
regions are considered separately. They correspond to the top-5 regions in EU-13 
according to labour productivity in 2015 (see Table 2). All of them exhibit a labour 
productivity level well above 50% of the European average (EU-13=1): London (1.63), 
Île de France (1.59), Stockholm (1.57), Brussels (1.53) and Hovedstaden (1.51).  
The shift-share analysis splits down differences in labour productivity across 
regions in three major components, as can be observed in equation 2. First, the within-
industry component represents the labour-productivity catch-up or divergence of each 
sector j with its equivalent in the leading region, weighted by the average share of 
employment in sector j. Second, the labour reallocation term measures the convergence 
resulting from labour flows across sectors and the convergence with the productive 
structure of the leading region. And third, the between-industry component captures in 
which extent the pattern of specialization followed by the leading region has increased 
distances with regard to the other regions. The left side of equation 2 denotes convergence 
with the leading region when sheds a positive sign; otherwise, divergence. The different 
terms of the right hand side represent also convergence or divergence in terms of the 
“within-industry”, “labour reallocation” and “between industry” components depending 
upon their respective signs are positive or negative. 
The study is based on the comparison of the 155 European NUTS-2 regions 
belonging to EU-13 with regard to each leading region taken separately and the results 
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are summarized in Figures 4 and 5.21 We have disaggregated the value added of the 
productive economy in ten activities corresponding to the three basic sectors: agriculture; 
industry (extractive industries and utilities, manufacturing and construction); and services 
(retail, trade and other market services; information and communication services; finance 
and professional activities; real state services and non-market services).  
On average the 155 European regions have diverged by -0.91% from the Region of 
Brussels (Brussels), -5.74% from Hovedstaden (Copenhagen), -14.73% from Ile de 
France (Paris) and -8.73% from Stockholm. Surprisingly, the shift-share analysis shed a 
balance of convergence with the richest region of Europe, the Greater London, by 3.45% 
between 2000 and 2015. This unexpected result is mainly attributable to the depreciation 
experienced by the British currency with regard to the euro since 2000. Labour 
productivity in the region of London was 1.70 the European average in 2000, fell to 1.35 
in 2009 and resumed progressively up to 1.63 in 2015. Consequently, the European 
regions have shortened their distances with London between 2000 and 2015. This 
optimistic result is in part a monetary illusion, and convergence in real terms is still 
questionable. In order to avoid the plausible bias entered by the monetary effect in the 
shift-share analysis, in what follows we won’t consider London as a reference region. 
 
  
																																																								
21	For the shake of clarity in Table 4, and in Figures 4 and 5, we have named the leading regions by their 
capital city name. For instance, London refers to Inner London; Brussels to the Region of Brussels;  
Copenhagen to Hovedstaden; Paris to Île-de-France and Stockholm to the Stockholm region.	
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Figure 4. Convergence in Labour Productivity with the top-5 European regions  
2000-2015 
 
 
Figure 5. Convergence in the shift-share components, 2000-2015 
 
SOURCE: See the text. The positive sign represents convergence with the leading region; the negative sign, 
divergence.  
 
Anyway, returning to the results of the shift-share analysis, the decomposition 
assigns most of the divergence to the “within-industry” component (Figure 5). In the 
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literature this component represent the “productivity differential” related with intrinsic 
regional attributes that make some regions more productive than others.22 In dynamic 
terms, the negative sign of this component denotes that the technological gap between the 
leading region and the rest has increased between 2000 and 2015. Table 4 details the 
magnitude of the “within-industry” component by industries. In general, all the leading 
regions have increased the within-industry distances with the rest of regions in 
manufacturing, IC services and finance. These activities are the most seemingly related 
with the new wave of technological change and confirm the hypothesis postulated above. 
In the remaining activities, such as agriculture, the retail and professional services we 
find mixed results, although the negative sign also prevails. 
Intense divergence in the “within-industry” component is usually related to 
divergence in the “between-industry” component, as can be found in the case of Île-de-
France or Stockholm. A negative sign of this component is a consequence of a greater 
specialization in the leading region in those activities where the region is more 
competitive, or where the productivity has increased with regard to the average. When 
we look underneath the total “between-industry” effect, we find that the leading regions 
have specialized more intensively than the other regions in IC services, finance and 
manufacturing, that it is to say, in those sectors more prone to IC technologies. Then, the 
negative “between industry” effect sign is mainly attributable to a pattern of specialization 
mainly based in those activities more related with the incorporation of new technologies. 
																																																								
22 The differences observed across regions in the ratio of capital per worker, the stock of human capital or 
the technological level are the main sound candidates to explain differences in productivity between 
regions. 
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Table 4.  Shift-share components by industry and leading region, 2000-2015 
 
Within-industry 
 
Labour 
reallocation 
Between 
industry 
 Agricult Utilities Manuf Const WRTAF IC serv Finance Prof serv TOTAL TOTAL TOTAL 
Bruxelles -4.36  3.64  -12.16  -1.77  -2.46  -0.24  -1.94  -0.04  -21.01  8.96  11.14  
Hovedstaden -1.32  9.20  -12.74  -0.56  -0.06  -2.64  -1.97  1.51  -8.53  2.78  0.02  
Île de France 1.13  -0.48  -2.99  1.94  -3.58  -1.91  -0.76  -1.75  -12.41  2.90  -5.22  
Stockholm -0.36  1.78  -6.87  2.44  -2.94  -1.57  -1.56  -1.62  -8.39  2.56  -2.90  
 
Source: Own elaboration, see the main text. 
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The second term of Equation 2 represents the movement of the labour force from 
one of the ten sectors to another in search for better job opportunities. As can be observed 
in Figure 5 the “labour reallocation” effect has been positive but practically negligible in 
the four cases analysed. We find two potential explanations for this nonentity contribution 
of the “structural change” to the overall divergence. One of them has to deal with the 
counterbalancing forces operating simultaneously in the leading and the medium and less 
developed regions with regards to the changing composition of the productive structure. 
While the low and medium productivity regions tend to emulate the productive structure 
of the head regions throughout a process of terciarization (convergence), the richest 
regions are reallocating workers towards the emerging high knowledge intensive 
industries and services (divergence). The final balance is a weak process of convergence.  
In the “labour-reallocation” component the increasing share of services in the non-
leading regions win out the emerging presence of modern activities in the leading regions. 
The size of modern sectors is still not big enough to have a determining impact on total 
“labour reallocation”. Moreover, one can consider that the new sectors are not still 
properly measured in the statistics. For instance, the high level of aggregation of the 
manufacturing industry could be masking part of this “structural change” occurring in the 
most advanced regions. Hence, in spite of we have broken down the economic structure 
of the regions in ten activities to capture a potential new “labour reallocation” effect, the 
current level of disaggregation still fails in taking a defined picture of it, at least for 
manufacturing. Consequently, part of the “reallocation effect” towards the new IC 
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industries remains hidden inside the “within-industry” effect yield by manufacturing in 
all the leading regions.23  
Finally, the “between-industry” component can be interpreted as that part of 
regional divergence derived from the specialization of the leading region in the most 
productive industries, as compared with the other regions. We find a negative “between-
industry” effect in Ile de France and Stockholm. The negative sign denotes that the 
leading regions tend to specialize more intensively than the others in those industries 
where productivity is increasing more than the average. Additionally, we find that most 
of the negative effect arises from three activities very close to the new wave of 
technological change: the extractive and energy industries, the IC services and finance. 
In general all the leading regions considered in our study exhibit a negative sign 
(divergence) in these sectors with regard to the non-leading regions, denoting a higher 
specialization in these industries. This important result gives support to the hypothesis 
that the current rise of regional disparities in Europe is mainly driven by some regions 
where large metropolitan capital cities are located and where the local conditions seem to 
be more favourable to attract the new industries. The exploitation of some urban 
agglomeration economies could act as a focus of attraction of knowledge intensive 
industries and services. 
Finally, in Maps 1 to 4 we have plotted the spatial distribution of the total “shift-
share” effect and its broken-down in the three components (within-industry, labour 
reallocation and between-industry). The main objective is to identify specific patterns 
																																																								
23	O´Leary and Webber (2015) arrived to similar conclusions in an analysis based on 181 European regions 
for 1980-2007. They find that the role of structural change in European regional productivity growth was 
far from negligible, and substantially stronger for those regions at the top of the distribution. 
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through the sign of each component that have to deal with spatial location of the region 
and with its level of development.  
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Map 1. Total shift-share convergence. Ile de France as reference region 
	
Map 2. “Within-industry” component. Ile de France as reference region. 
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Map 3. “Labour reallocation” component. Ile-de-France as reference region 
	
Map 4. “Between-industry” component. Ile-de-France as reference region 
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For brevity reason, we have represented only the results with regard to Ile-de-
France (Paris). The reference region is coloured in black, while divergent regions are light 
grey-coloured, and convergent regions are dark grey-coloured. The negative sign 
(divergence) dominates Map 1 where the “total shift-share” is plotted, that it is to say, Ile-
de-France is getting distance in terms of labour productivity with most of the European 
regions. The exceptions are some of the poorest regions in Spain (Castilla-La Mancha), 
Portugal (Centro) and the Eastern part of Germany (Branderburg, Sachsen and 
Thüringen) that have come through its backwardness levels and have reduced their 
distances with the leading region.  
Map 2 confirms that the “total shift-share” effect is dominated by divergence arising 
from the “within-industry” component. Again, most of the regions in Europe are 
diverging from Ile-de-France due to a higher technological advance in this leading region. 
Simultaneously, only some of the most backward regions in Europe, located in Portugal, 
Spain and Eastern Germany, have progressed enough to catch-up with the leader, possible 
by taking advantage of their backwardness or by benefiting from European redistributive 
policies. Map 4 where the “between-industry” effect is drawn reinforces the spatial 
distribution of the “within-industry” effect. Divergence with regard to Ile-de-France 
dominates the map, confirming that this leading region is becoming more specialized in 
high productivity industries when compared with the middle and low incomer regions. 
However, when compared with the richest regions in Europe the dark grey colour 
(positive sign) dominates the map (London, Stockholm, Helsinki; Bremen, Hamburg, 
Baden-Würthemberg, Bayern, Hessen; Piemonte, Lombardia, Veneto, Emilia-Rogmana 
and Marche) are becoming more specialized in the most productive sectors than Ile-de-
France.  
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Finally, in Map 3 “labour-reallocation” convergence with Ile-de-France dominates 
across the European regions. Although positive, this effect is not high enough to 
counterbalance the divergent forces coming from the technological advance and the 
subsequent pattern of specialization. Hence Map 1, where the three effects are 
summarized, reveals that most of the European regions have diverged with Ile-de-France, 
and only some backward regions in Portugal, Spain and the Eastern part of Germany have 
achieved convergence with this leading region. The results obtained for Ile-de-France 
could be extended to the other leading regions. 
  
4. Conclusions 
In this paper we analysed the evolution of regional income disparities in 13 European 
countries over 2000-2015 at NUTS-2 level. The results obtained confirm the upsurge of 
regional income inequality in Europe. Additionally, we observe that it has been mainly 
driven by the fast progress of some of the richest regions in Europe, while low and middle 
income regions get closer to the European average in 2015 than they used to be in 2000; 
simultaneously, an increasing number of the low income regions are getting trapped at 
the bottom pole of the distribution. Therefore, a more polarized structure of income 
distribution emerges. These results are in line with the idea of a N-curve between per 
capita income and regional inequality observed for the United States (Ganong and Shoag, 
2017) and connect with the long run trend observed for the European regions (Rosés and 
Wolf, 2019).  
The same arguments that Williamson (1965)’s used to explain U-inverted 
relationship between per capita income and regional inequality in the past could be 
extrapolated to explain the consequences of the new technological wave on regional 
disparities (Barrios and Strobl, 2009). At first stages of industrialization, unequal 
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structural change was the main source increasing inequality across regions (Williamson, 
1965). Now other types of technological shocks could entail structural changes that alter 
productivity and have a dissimilar impact across regions (Barrios and Strobl, 2009). 
Nowadays cutting-edge technologies are more knowledge-intensive than the traditional 
ones and generate activities more intensive in the use of highly skilled workers and the 
exploitation of R&D networks. These new activities tend to concentrate in large 
metropolitan areas where the firms could meet their demands for high skilled workers 
and capital in high-turnover factor markets and could at the same time benefit from the 
advantages of market size.  
The dynamic shift-share study performed taking as reference the regions identified 
as productivity leaders in Europe let to conclude that these regions, most of them capital 
cities homes, have increased labour productivity more than the average in 2000-2015. 
And their success has been mainly conducted by a bigger increase in productivity within 
most industries (within-industry effect) and a higher specialization in the most dynamic 
industries (between-industry effect). The divergence in terms of the within-industry effect 
extents to most industries, but especially to those more closely related with the new wave 
of technological change (manufacturing, IC services, finance, professional services and 
retail services). Meanwhile the between industry effect reveals that the prosperity in the 
richest regions of Europe could be linked to a pattern of specialization the most productive 
industries. 
The descriptive study of regional disparities and the shift-share analysis addressed 
in this paper run in support of some sort of technological shock that is affecting differently 
the European regions and that tends to concentrate the new activities in the richest regions 
of Europe, where the biggest cities are located. Notwithstanding these highlighting 
results, the sign of the “labour reallocation” effect does not let us to confirm, at least by 
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now, that the “structural change” is becoming a central force to explain the new upsurge 
in European inequality, as it used to be in the past.  
We are aware of the weaknesses derived from the use of a level of sector 
disaggregation that do not let to capture interesting changes in the productive structure, 
specially inside the manufacturing sector. The official statistical offices also recognize 
problems to correctly identify, measure and define the new sectors, jobs and capital. 
Lastly, and not less relevant, it is possible that the concept of “structural change” based 
in the idea of labour reallocation is getting obsolete in an era of technological change less 
intensive in job creation. Whether the under-representation of the “structural change” in 
the explanation of overall changes in regional inequality is a question of  time, data or 
concept are matters that should be addressed in future research agendas. 
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